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Abstract
Parents exaggerate communicative cues (Infant-Directed Speech, IDS; smiling; gaze to children) when pretending or joking, but it is
not clear why. Additionally, referential cues (gaze, point to objects) remain unexamined in these contexts. Across Action (N = 25; 16--20
months) and Verbal (N = 43; 20--24 months) studies, parents pretended, joked, and interacted literally with toddlers. Examined was
whether parents use the above cues to express positive emotion, grab attention, or for pedagogical purposes. Parents exaggerated IDS,
and sometimes smiling, when joking or pretending to express positive emotion. For younger toddlers, parents increased gaze to toddlers
and smiling when joking compared to pretend and literal contexts, feasibly to grab attention to scaffold joke understanding. Parents
decreased gaze to objects when joking, plausibly to avoid toddlers generalizing jokes’ false information, following pedagogy theory.
Younger toddlers responded appropriately to parents’ cues, highlighting how toddlers could distinguish intentions to joke from other acts.
Parents and toddlers treated pretending as literal. In the older group, parents and toddlers did not distinguish contexts, perhaps because
older toddlers rely on sophisticated cues, e.g., language, over the low-level cues measured.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).
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Understanding the non-literal world, such as pretending and joking, is an essential part of development. Without this
ability, we might not try out new ideas, or think of things in new and different ways. However, distinguishing literal from non-
literal information may be difficult for toddlers. Toddlers have a limited understanding of artifacts and language, so simply
using an object in a wrong or unusual way, or saying something wrong or unusual, may not be enough for toddlers to
identify that information was not literal. Of even greater difficulty could be distinguishing different forms of non-literal
intentions. While toddlers engage in joking from the first year (Addyman and Addyman, 2013; Hoicka and Akhtar, 2012;
Mireault et al., 2012), and pretending in the second year (Bosco et al., 2006; Jackowitz and Watson, 1980), it may be
difficult for them to determine which of these two non-literal intentions others are expressing. One goal of the two
exploratory studies is to determine whether communicative cues (Infant-Directed Speech, IDS; direct gaze; smiling) and
referential cues (gazing or pointing to objects) help toddlers distinguish pretend, joke, and literal contexts during parent--
child interactions. In particular, will parents exaggerate or understate these cues in each of these contexts. A further goal is
to determine how these cues might help, i.e., by signaling positive emotion, attention grabbing, or pedagogy.
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Past research shows parents use explicit cues to express they are joking and pretending with their toddlers. When
parents joke, they use disbelief language; that is, they correct the content of their jokes. For instance, if a parent jokes,
‘‘The ducks say moo’’, they often follow this up with a sentence such as, ‘‘Ducks don’t say moo!’’ or ‘‘What do ducks really
say?’’ (Hoicka and Butcher, in press; Hoicka et al., 2008). Parents also use a rising linear contour when joking, making the
joke sound questionable (Hoicka and Gattis, 2012). When pretending to eat or drink, parents repeat actions (e.g., spoon to
mouth), refer to the referent (e.g., cheerios), and make sound effects more often than when really eating and drinking
(Lillard et al., 2007; Lillard and Witherington, 2004).
One limitation of explicit cues is children need to attend to and understand disbelief language, question intonation
contours, the labels of references, and the meaning behind sound effects to interpret their parents’ cues. If toddlers do not
yet have enough knowledge to make sense of these cues, a low-level bottom-up approach might serve them better. Even
if they have the capacity to understand this information, ensuring children attend to the information is important. Past
research shows parents use a variety of subtle cues to distinguish joking or pretending from literal contexts. Parents
exaggerate features of IDS, including increased pitch and pitch variation, when joking and pretending versus speaking or
acting literally (Hoicka and Gattis, 2012; Lillard et al., 2007; Reissland and Snow, 1996). Parents gaze to their toddler more
when pretending, and sometimes smile more (Lillard et al., 2007). Parents smile more when clowning with their 3-to 6-
month-olds (Mireault et al., 2012). Toddlers themselves smile while looking for a reaction more often when joking than
playing literally (Hoicka and Akhtar, 2012), but smile less and look to the experimenter more when pretending versus
acting literally (Rakoczy et al., 2005). However, this research does not tell us why parents use these cues when joking and
pretending, nor whether parents use these cues to distinguish joking and pretending.
One possibility is that parents increased communicative cues in past studies to express positive emotion. Positive
emotion shares several features with IDS (e.g., Banse and Scherer, 1996; Wassink et al., 2007; Fernald and Simon, 1984;
Nakata and Trehub, 2004) including increased mean pitch, pitch variation, mean amplitude (loudness), and amplitude
variation. IDS may increase emotional rapport between infants and caregivers (Werker and Mcleod, 1989), and infants
may prefer IDS because it sounds happy (Singh et al., 2002). Additionally, people increase eye contact when emotionally
positive (Lalljee, 1978). Finally, smiling is universally linked to positive emotion, such as happiness, joy, enjoyment, or
amusement (Darwin, 1955; Ekman and Rosenberg, 2005). Thus parents may have exaggerated communicative cues
when joking or pretending versus acting literally because the control situations were serious, or at minimum less playful
(Hoicka and Gattis, 2012; Lillard et al., 2007; Mireault et al., 2012; Reissland and Snow, 1996). If these cues are about
positive emotion, then we would expect parents to use these cues to a greater extent when playing literally (such as
playing with a toy car as a toy car), pretending or joking, compared to interacting in a serious way with their child.
Hoicka and Gattis (2012) suggested parents used IDS when joking to grab toddlers’ attention to scaffold the difficult
information inherent to a joke. Therefore a second reason parents might increase the use of communicative cues when
joking or pretending could be to grab toddlers’ attention. This would be a good strategy as several experiments found
infants pay more attention when communicative cues are used. Six-month-olds are more likely to follow gaze to an object
when direct gaze or IDS are first used (Senju and Csibra, 2008). Four-month-olds are more likely to attend to a speaker
playing IDS versus Adult-Directed Speech (ADS) (Fernald and Kuhl, 1987). Parents use features of IDS to grab toddlers’
attention in difficult situations, such as noisy environments (Newman, 2003). Finally, infants better attend to and resolve
difficult problems, such as discovering word boundaries and parsing sentences, when spoken in IDS versus ADS
(Thiessen et al., 2005).
While communicative cues have been studied in non-literal contexts, referential cues have not. These cues draw
attention to the object, e.g., gaze to the object or pointing (Csibra and Gergely, 2006). According to pedagogy theory, both
communicative and referential cues are used to express that information is generalizable. If this is the case, we would
expect that parents would decrease their use of communicative and referential cues when joking and pretending as the
information is not literal, and hence not generalizable. Another possibility is that the combination of communicative and
referential cues is important to pedagogy, and so we might expect that parents would decrease their communicative-
referential cue combinations (where referential cues quickly follow communicative cues) when acting non-literally.
However, recent research suggests children learn literal, generalizable information through pretending (Hopkins et al.,
2015; Sutherland and Friedman, 2012, 2013; Weisberg and Gopnik, 2013). Therefore it is also possible that parents will
treat pretend play as literal, and so not decrease any cues in a pretend situation, but still decrease them in a joke situation.
This highlights a second aspect of non-literal play -- that perhaps joking and pretending will be treated differently by
parents. When parents joke with their toddlers, they show more disbelief and less belief through their language and
actions than when they pretend (Hoicka and Butcher, in press). Furthermore, using a normativity paradigm, when a first
experimenter pretends with 2-year-olds, toddlers are very normative about how a second experimenter plays, and
expects them to play in the same way. However, when a first experimenter jokes with 2-year-olds, toddlers are very open,
and allow a second experimenter to play however she likes (Hoicka and Martin, in press). This suggests toddlers see
pretending as a time for following rules, whereas they see joking as a time to be open-minded and try out different things.
We may then expect parents to treat pretending and joking differently, even when the cues are subtle. Again, as
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suggested by research on learning (Hopkins et al., 2015; Sutherland and Friedman, 2012, 2013; Weisberg and Gopnik,
2013), we might expect parents to express pretending as literal, while treating joking more distinctly.
In the current studies, parents joked, pretended, and acted literally (in both positive play and neutral contexts) with their
toddlers. Study 1 focussed on younger toddlers’ (16--20 months) action-based joking, pretending, and literal play. Study 2
focussed on older toddlers’ (20--24 months) verbally-based joking, pretending, and literal play. The first goal for both
studies was to determine whether parents increase their communicative and referential cues, as well as communicative-
referential combinations, in non-literal contexts because:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): they are expressing increased positive emotion. That is, parents exaggerate cues in joke, pretend,
and play situations, compared to neutral situations.
H2/H3: they are bidding for attention, perhaps to scaffold a difficult concept. That is, parents exaggerate cues in both
joke and pretend scenarios (H2) or joke scenarios only (H3), to ensure children are paying attention and understand
what is being said or done.
H4/H5: Alternatively, following pedagogy theory, parents could theoretically decrease cues during joke and pretend
scenarios (H4), or joke scenarios only (H5) to avoid children generalizing literally false information.
The second goal was to determine whether parents distinguish joking and pretending through communicative and
referential cues; in particular, whether parents treat pretending more as joking (H2/H4) or literal (H3/H5). The third goal was
to determine how children respond, both to the different contexts, and to parents’ cues. For instance, we might expect that
parents’ gaze toward objects would lead toddlers to gaze toward objects, since infants and toddlers follow others’ gaze
(Carpenter et al., 1998; Senju et al., 2008). We might also expect toddlers to smile more when parents do so as smiling is
contagious (Mojzisch et al., 2006; Schilbach et al., 2008), and parents’ smiles encourage infants’ smiles (Mireault et al.,
2014, 2015). Thus parental cues may guide toddlers to appropriately distinguish contexts, providing a low-level
mechanism by which toddlers might learn to distinguish joke, pretend, and literal acts.
1. Study 1: Action Study
Study 1 examined action-based joking, pretending, literal play and serious literal interactions. Jokes involved misusing
objects, which are produced and understood as early as 15 months (Hoicka and Wang, 2011; Loizou, 2005; McGhee,
1979). Pretend actions involved pre-symbolic pretense for half the trials (e.g., ‘‘drinking’’ out of empty cup, where the
object is still the actual object), which is produced and understood as early as 15 months; and object substitution (e.g.,
using long tube as scarf), which is understood as early as 15 months when the substitute is similar in form to the original
(Bosco et al., 2006; Onishi et al., 2007). Thus joke and pretend actions were appropriate for the age range.
1.1. Method
1.1.1. Participants
Twenty-five parents (1 father) and their toddlers (M = 17 months, 12 days, range = 16 months, 0 days to 20 months
1 day; 13 boys) participated. Another five participants were excluded because children refused to participate. All children
were Caucasian. Parents had a high school diploma (5), an undergraduate degree (9), a postgraduate degree (7) or did
not report their education level (4). Participants were recruited through parent and toddler activities, and advertising
through posters, facebook, and parenting websites.
1.1.2. Materials
Objects for the washing scenarios included a washing-up bin, water, liquid soap bottles, liquid soap, sponges, and
cloths. Objects for the dressing scenarios included hats, scarves, gloves, plastic envelopes, a round sponge, and a long
plastic tube. Objects for the eating scenarios included small cookies, pieces of rice cakes, water, orange drink, a clear
plastic bottle, a clear plastic cup, and a plate. Objects for the coloring scenarios included papers with shape outlines,
crayons, and sticks. Two Sony digital camcorders recorded the sessions. A Shure head-mounted microphone fit into an
Olympus MP3 recorder recorded parents’ speech. Videos were coded with Observer software. Audio files were coded
with Praat software (Boersma and Weenink, 2008).
1.1.3. Design
The design was within-subjects. For the main analyses, the independent variable was the Action Type for each trial:
Joke, Pretend, Positive Literal, or Neutral Literal. The dependent variables included (1): parents’ communicative cues:
gaze to child (seconds/minute; s/m), smiling (s/m), composite IDS score composed of summing z-scores of: speech rate
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(syllables/second; reversed), mean pitch (semitones, st), pitch standard deviation (st), mean amplitude (decibels, dB),
amplitude standard deviation (dB); (2) parents’ referential cues: gaze to objects (s/m), point to object (yes or no each trial);
(3) parents’ communicative-referential combinations, i.e., the number of occasions a referential cue followed a
communicative cue within 3 s (frequency/minute); children’s communicative cues: gaze to parent (s/m), smiling (s/m); and
(4) children’s referential cues: gaze to objects (s/m). Children’s pointing was originally coded, but this behavior was too
rare to analyze. Children’s age was examined for whether it interacted with the main independent variables. For the lag
sequential analyses examining parent--child interactions, the variables were the above dependent variables which
showed a non-null pattern of results in the initial analyses, as well as when parents and children stopped smiling or
pointing as controls (if required).
1.1.4. Procedure and counter-balancing
Before the study, parents were only told that we were interested in discovering how parents and toddlers interact when
playing, including when they joke and pretend. Therefore the hypotheses were not disclosed. Each parent and toddler sat
at a table, with the parent in a chair, and the toddler in a high chair. Parents acted out four trials for two minutes each: Joke,
Pretend, Positive Literal, and Neutral Literal. At the beginning of Neutral Literal trials, parents were told, ‘‘Be serious while
you. . . (e.g., ‘‘eat a snack.’’) At the beginning of Positive Literal trials, parents were told, ‘‘Show your excitement and
happiness. . . (e.g., ‘‘about having a special treat.’’) At the beginning of Pretend trials, parents were told, ‘‘You are going to
pretend that. . .’’ (e.g., ‘‘you’re eating and drinking with your child.’’) At the beginning of Joke trials, parents were told, ‘‘Use
the objects the wrong way to make jokes with your child.’’ Children could have heard these general instructions, however it
seems unlikely that they would show a greater effect than parents’ interactions themselves. We chose to instruct parents
to show their excitement and happiness in the Positive Literal condition, and to be serious in the Neutral Literal condition.
These were both important controls to determine which variables related to attention-grabbing (i.e., distinguishing literal
and non-literal contexts), and which related to emotion (see Hoicka and Akhtar, 2011).
Each trial had three Target Sentences paired with Target Actions that parents could say and act out at any point during
the trials. The Target Sentences were the same across Action Type (Joke, Pretend, Positive Literal, Neutral Literal), but
Target Actions varied across Action Types (see Appendix A for all pairings). Parents said each of three Target Sentences
(e.g., in the Eating trial: ‘‘I’m going to have a drink’’) and acted out one of the corresponding actions (e.g., Neutral Literal:
drink water from cup; Positive Literal: drink orange drink from cup; Pretend: put empty cup to mouth; Joke: put cup of water
to elbow). The actions were described on paper, with an accompanying photo in the Joke trials. We chose not to include
an accompanying photo for the Literal and Pretend trials because the actions chosen were conventional and well-known,
even if the objects differed. For example, if a parent was asked to pretend to drink from an empty cup, the action itself is
easily identified. However, the joke actions did not necessarily correspond to conventional actions, e.g., we do not
typically put anything to our elbow, including a cup of water. Therefore we used a photo to ensure parents understood the
task, and to make performance as similar as possible across the Joke trials. Target Sentences were the same across trials
to allow experimental control -- any differences in responses by parents and children would be attributed to how the Target
Actions related to the Target Sentences, and could not be attributed to the Target Sentences alone. While using specific
sentences and actions gave better experimental control, it may have made the study less naturalistic. However, this was
deemed necessary to avoid confounds, and parents appeared to act naturally throughout the study. Since these
instructions were printed on paper kept away from the child, children only learned about this information through their
parents. Additionally, it was necessary to use different objects across trials. For instance, if we had used gloves in all three
conditions, it would be difficult for a parent to pretend to put on the glove if it really was a glove -- this would lead them to
literally putting on a glove. Thus we chose, in this instance, plastic envelopes so that parents could actually pretend.
Additionally, we made the literal items more exciting in the Positive Literal trials to increase positive affect, and we made
them less exciting in the Neutral Literal conditions to keep affect neutral.
Joke, Pretend, Positive Literal, and Neutral Literal trial types were crossed with Washing, Eating, Dressing, and
Coloring scenarios (see Appendix A for all scenarios). For example, one parent would act out joke washing (e.g.,
putting foam on nose instead of hands), then neutral literal eating (e.g., eating rice cakes), then positive literal
dressing (e.g., putting hat on head), and then pretend coloring (e.g., moving sticks on paper). However another parent
would act out pretend eating (e.g., moving fingers from plate to mouth, without food), then positive literal coloring
(e.g., coloring with crayons on paper), then neutral literal washing (e.g., wash hands with soap and water), then joke
dressing (e.g., putting hat under arm; see Appendix B for counterbalancing). This was to ensure no carry-over from
one trial to the next. For instance, if a parent joked they were drinking on one trial, and on the next trial, literally drank,
parents and toddlers might return to the joke drinking if they found it fun, and not distinguish the contexts. Parents and
children played with distractor objects (hammer bench, xylophone, ring stacker, one per trial, in that order) for one
minute between trials.
Children played with objects with their parents throughout the trials. The experimenter sat behind an occluder during
the trials, and switched the objects between trials.
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1.1.5. Coding
Parents’ gaze to child, children’s gaze to parent, parents’ pointing, and parents’ and children’s gaze to objects, and smiles
were coded continuously throughout trials from video using Observer software. Smile coding did not include laughter since
laughter is not thought to be a marker of pedagogy or pretend play, while it is considered a marker of joking. Therefore
including laughter might bias the smiling results in favor of joking, even though this is not the key concept being explored.
Target Sentences were coded for acoustic features of speech as in Hoicka and Gattis (2012) including speech rate
(syllables/second), mean pitch (st), pitch standard deviation (st), mean amplitude (dB), and amplitude standard deviation
(dB), in Praat software. Target Sentences were coded instead of continuous speech because phonemes themselves
carry specific acoustic features (Lehiste and Peterson, 1959). By making the Target Sentences the same across
conditions the acoustic features were isolated in relation to the page contexts.
Past research found that combining separate acoustic features (including mean pitch and pitch variability) allows the
classification of different pragmatic categories within IDS (attention, approval, comfort) when using discriminant functions
analysis (Katz et al., 1996). This suggests the combining of features is important in IDS, not just the summary variables.
However, since discriminant functions analysis could not be combined with MANOVA GORIC (see below), z-scores of each
variable were collapsed together to give a gestalt IDS score. z-Scores were assigned to each acoustic feature (speech rate,
mean pitch, pitch standard deviation, mean amplitude, amplitude standard deviation) for Target Sentences within each
participant. For instance, if a participant said 10 sentences correctly that were not masked by noise (e.g., child yelling),
z-scores were calculated for the set of 10 sentences for each of speech rate, mean pitch, etc. Then the z-scores for mean
pitch, pitch standard deviation, mean amplitude, and amplitude standard deviation were added up, and the z-score for
speech rate was subtracted (as exaggerated IDS has a lower speech rate). This led to a final number which represented how
exaggerated (positive) or understated (negative) IDS was for each sentence within that individual’s own range.
We did not code agreement for IDS as Praat software automatically coded features of sentences. Three videos (13%)
were coded for parents’ pointing, and parents’ and children’s gaze (to each other and object), and smiles, by determining
whether or not the coders judged the same behavior at the beginning of each second. Agreement was very good for
pointing, k = 1.00, and good for gaze, k = 0.70, and smiles, k = 0.68. Communicative-referential combinations were
derived from contingency analyses, therefore these were not coded for agreement.
1.2. Results and discussion
1.2.1. Data analysis
Initial analyses revealed no effects of or interactions with age. Data were analyzed with MANOVA using the software
Generalized Order-Restricted Information Criterion (GORIC; Kuiper and Hoijtink, 2013; Kuiper et al., 2011, 2012). A standard
MANOVA with a p-value tells us if there is a general effect between conditions or not. However, it cannot reveal the best
theoretical explanation for multiple conditions, i.e., distinguishing whether positive emotion, attention, or pedagogy best
explain the data. GORIC was chosen as it compares several theories at once to explain a data set. In Bayesian statistics, data
is fitted to different theoretical models, and each model is adjusted for complexity (more complex models are given a higher
penalty for fit). The best model is the one with the best fit, giving the best explanation of the data. See van de Schoot et al.
(2011) for an explanation of when Bayesian model selection is used, and Kuiper and Hoijtink (2013) for an explanation of how
to build these models. The models used in these analyses were (H = hypothesis, m = mean):
Cue not used to express any of above; all parameters free (guards against weak hypotheses, Kuiper and Hoijtink, 2013):
H0: mjoke, mpositive literal, mpretend, mneutral literal
Cue exaggerated to express positive emotion:
H1: mjoke = mpretend = mpositive literal > mneutral literal
Cue exaggerated to grab attention to scaffold difficult concept; pretend = joke:
H2: mjoke = mpretend > mpositive literal = mneutral literal
Cue exaggerated to grab attention to scaffold difficult concept; pretend = literal:
H3: mjoke > mpretend = mpositive literal = mneutral literal
Cue understated to avoid generalizing information; pretend = joke:
H4: mpositive literal = mneutral literal > mpretend = mjoke
Cue understated to avoid generalizing information; pretend = literal:
H5: mpositive literal = mneutral literal = mpretend > mjoke
Since Target Sentences were not always said, or were sometimes masked with noise, the cumulative z-scores were
averaged for all Target Sentences within each condition for each participant. For instance if a parent said all three joke
Target Sentences, the joke IDS score would be the average of these three sentences. If the parent said only one
sentence, the IDS score would be that sentence’s score alone. Eight parents were not included in the IDS GORIC
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MANOVA because they had at least one trial where they either said none of the Target Sentences correctly, or the Target
Sentences were masked with noise. This left 17 parents for the IDS analysis. Due to a technical fault, the pretend trial was
not video recorded for one dyad, therefore they were not include in the other analyses, leaving 24 participants.
Children’s gaze to objects, and parents’ communicative-referential combinations had outliers (defined as more than
1.5 times the interquartile range from the median) which caused skewness. Removing outliers normalized the data (see
Judd et al., 1995). Box-Cox transformations found a natural log transformation normalized parents’ smiles and children’s
gaze to parents. An inverse square root transformation normalized children’s smiles (see Box and Cox, 1964; Osborne,
2010). No transformation normalized pointing data, therefore non-parametric statistics were used. Unfortunately there is
currently no Bayesian statistic to examine repeated measures non-parametric data. Therefore instead, the likelihood
of pointing was modeled using logit mixed effects models (LMEM) with the LME4 package (Bates et al., 2008) in R
(R Development Core Team, 2009; see Hoicka and Akhtar, 2011; Jaeger, 2008), which at least measures differences
between conditions for repeated-measures non-parametric data. LMEM examined group differences, grouping data
following the six hypotheses.
1.2.2. Parents’ cues and children’s responses
Fig. 1 gives the means and standard errors for parents’ IDS. Fig. 2 gives the means and standard errors for parents’
and children’s smiles. Fig. 3 gives the means and standard errors for parents’ and children’s gaze to objects and each
other. Fig. 4 gives the means and standard errors for parents’ communicative-referential combinations.
Table 1 shows the model fits for each theory for each dependent variable. A lower value indicates a model with
a better fit.
Out of 24 trials, parents pointed on 7 of the Joke trials, 9 of the Pretend trials, 14 of the Positive Literal trials, and 7 of the
Neutral Literal trials. None of the hypotheses significantly improved the LMEM for pointing, all p > .05.
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Fig. 2. Mean number of seconds per minute parents and children smiled, by condition and study. Error bars represent standard errors.
Fig. 1. Exaggeration/understatement of parents’ IDS, by condition and study. A high score indicates exaggeration. A low score indicates
understatement. Error bars represent standard errors.
According to the GORIC MANOVAs in Table 1, parents most likely increased their use of communicative cues to
express positive emotion or grab attention. In particular, parents most likely exaggerated IDS to increase positive emotion
(H1). Parents most likely increased smiling and gaze to children to bid for attention (H3).
According to Table 1, parents most likely increased their use of referential cues to indicate that information is
generalizable. Generalizable (versus non-generalizable) contexts led to an increase in parents’ gaze to objects (H5). Thus
referential cues may be key to pedagogy theory.
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Fig. 4. Mean number of parents’ communicative-referential combinations per minute, by condition and study. Error bars represent standard
errors.
Fig. 3. Mean number of seconds per minute parents and children spent gazing to child/parent, and object, by condition and study. Error bars
represent standard errors.
According to Table 1, positive emotion best explained parents’ increase in communicative-referential combinations
(H1). Therefore parents may increase their use of communicative cues before referential cues when they are happy, rather
than to express that information is generalizable.
According to Table 1, children were more socially and emotionally engaged during non-generalizable contexts
(smiling, gaze to parents), and more engaged with objects in generalizable contexts (gaze to objects). Children smiled
more in more emotionally positive situations (H1), gazed to parents more in situations requiring more attention (H3), and
gazed to objects more in generalizable contexts (H5). This suggests children responded appropriately to the contexts,
focussing more on parents when socially warranted, and more on objects when pedagogically warranted.
When parents used cues to bid for attention (gaze to child, smiling), or to express that information is generalizable
(gaze to objects), parents treated pretending as literal rather than joking. Similarly, children also treated pretending as
literal rather than joking (gaze to parents, objects). This suggests parents and children use these cues to distinguish joking
and pretending. While joking may seem non-literal, abstract, or wrong (e.g., Hoicka and Gattis, 2008; Hoicka et al., 2008),
pretending may seem literal, reflecting definitions of pretense suggesting it is right in one’s imagination (Nichols and Stich,
2003). Parents take the fact that the pretend scenario is right in one’s imagination seriously, and mostly express
pretending as right and generalizable. Indeed, this converges with evidence showing parents and their 16- to 24-month-
olds also distinguish joking and pretending through belief and disbelief language and actions, and treat pretending as
more literal than joking (Hoicka and Butcher, in press).
1.2.3. Parent--child interactions
Lag-sequential analyses (LSA) examined more closely how parents’ cues predicted children’s behaviors. These
analyses allow one to determine which behaviors are more or less likely to follow other behaviors than chance within
a large array of behaviors, avoiding Type 2 error from repeated analyses. See Bakeman and Gottman (1997) for
detailed explanations of this analysis; or Montague et al. (2011) for a concise introduction. We examined the effects
of parents’ gaze to children and objects, exaggerated and understated IDS, and smiling (as well as when parents
ceased to smile as a control), on children’s gaze to parents and objects, and smiling (as well as when children ceased
to smile), as parents and children used these to distinguish conditions. A 3-s time lag was used (behaviors were
on average 2.5 s long, allowing parents and children time to react to each other). The total number of times
each behavior followed another within 3 s was calculated automatically by Interact software’s contingency analysis.
Table 2 shows all frequencies, conditional probabilities, and adjusted residuals (AR) of each Behavior Type
(e.g., Child Smile) following each Behavior Type (e.g., Parent Smile) within 3 s, across all participants and conditions.
The distribution of behaviors in Table 2 was significantly different than expected by chance, x2(24) = 93.40, p < .01.
ARs greater or equal to 1.96 suggest one behavior follows another significantly more often than chance would predict,
while ARs smaller or equal to 1.96 suggest one behavior follows another significantly less often than chance would
predict.
According to Table 2, children were more likely to gaze to their parents after their parents gazed at them, but less likely
once parents ceased smiling. Children were more likely to gaze to objects after parents gazed to objects, but less likely
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Table 1
GORIC values of each model for all parental cues, and children’s engagement in Study 1. Numbers in bold indicate best models. IDS = Infant-
Directed Speech.
N Unrestricted Emotion Attention Pedagogy
Pretend Pretend
=Joke =Literal =Joke =Literal
H0 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5
Parents
Gaze to child 24 701.56 710.81 710.74 696.79 710.82 710.82
Smiles 24 236.66 245.88 248.17 233.59 252.58 252.58
IDS 17 226.46 222.51 224.73 223.21 225.04 225.04
Gaze to objects 24 703.57 720.77 720.78 720.77 717.58 699.82
Communicative 22
-> Referential 429.07 426.07 426.35 429.88 429.88 429.56
Children
Gaze to parent 24 237.23 244.25 242.06 232.64 247.37 247.37
Smile 24 24.23 28.03 25.17 27.56 25.17 25.17
Gaze to objects 21 564.33 563.75 564.64 564.63 563.14 562.02
after parents smiled. Children were more likely to smile after parents smiled, but less likely after parents ceased smiling.
Finally, children were more likely to cease smiling after parents both smiled or ceased smiling, and were less likely to
cease smiling after parents used understated IDS, or gazed to the child. The general pattern suggests parents’
communicative cues increased children’s communicative responses and decreased their referential responses, while
parents’ referential cues increased children’s referential responses.
These data suggest one way in which children might distinguish contexts, as demonstrated by the GORIC MANOVAs.
As parents’ cues distinguished contexts, and as parents’ cues predicted children’s engagement, this could mean children
distinguished contexts, at least in part, by responding to parents’ cues. For instance, if a parent gazes more to their child in
a joke context, this could cause the child to gaze to their parent, and this may then lead to children gazing to their parents
more in joke contexts. Thus parents might help children distinguish contexts through a low-level mechanism of cue-
following.
2. Study 2: Verbal Study
Study 2 examined whether parents use cues in the same way as in the Action Study, and whether toddlers respond in
the same way, during verbally-based interactions. In particular, Study 2 examined whether cues are guided by the
expression of positive emotion, attention grabbing, or pedagogy; as well as whether parents treat pretending as joking or
literal. Toddlers dramatically increase their vocabulary from 16 to 24 months (Fenson et al., 1994; Hamilton et al., 2000).
Toddlers’ joking and pretending therefore become more verbal. Toddlers mislabel objects quite different to the original as
a joke from 2 years (Hoicka and Akhtar, 2011; McGhee, 1979). Children also pretend through object substitution
somewhat proficiently from 2 years when objects look dissimilar to the original objects, but have no obvious function, e.g.,
a block (Elder and Pederson, 1978; Fein, 1975; Jackowitz and Watson, 1980).
This was not a replication of the Action Study. Instead, the goal was to determine whether parents use communicative
and referential cues in the same way as in the Action Study, using examples of joking and pretending that are
developmentally appropriate for older toddlers. An interesting aspect of this stage of development is that joke and pretend
acts converge to some extent (object substitution), although the form of object substitution is still somewhat different. In
particular, joke objects often have a distinct form and function, while pretend objects have a distinct form, but an
ambiguous function. This in turn may affect how much parents distinguish joke and pretend contexts; i.e., they may
distinguish these contexts less. Additionally, pretending at this stage looks more wrong than earlier pretending, thus
parents may distinguish pretending from literal play to a greater extent. Finally, a larger group of fathers was tested to
determine whether mothers and fathers cue toddlers in the same way.
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Table 2
Observed frequencies (top row, no brackets), expected frequencies (top row, in brackets), conditional probabilities (middle row) and adjusted
residuals (bottom row) of toddlers’ behavior types following parents’ behavior types within 3 s, across all participants and conditions in Study 1.
Follows within 3 s
Child
Gaze parent Gaze object Smile Cease smiling
Parent
Gaze child 307 (265) 467 (465) 129 (125) 124 (173)
30% 45% 13% 12%
(3.46)* (0.18) (0.48) (5.93)*
Gaze object 239 (247) 465 (433) 110 (116) 144 (161)
25% 49% 12% 15%
(0.72) (2.40)* (0.79) (1.91)
Smile 102 (115) 167 (201) 73 (54) 103 (75)
23% 38% 16% 23%
(1.58) (3.89)* (2.56)* (3.29)*
Cease smiling 95 (127) 226 (222) 44 (60) 126 (83)
19% 46% 9% 26%
(4.11)* (0.38) (2.76)* (4.63)*
Exaggerated IDS 13 (10) 16 (17) 4 (4) 4 (6)
35% 43% 11% 11%
(1.12) (0.25) (0.27) (1.23)
Understated IDS 16 (10) 14 (17) 4 (4) 3 (6)
43% 38% 11% 8%
(1.89) (1.00) (0.27) (2.06)*
* p < .05.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
A separate group of 43 parents (19 fathers) and their toddlers (age M = 21 months, 12 days, range = 19 months,
22 days to 24 months 13 days; 23 boys) participated. One child was Black and all other children were Caucasian. Parents
completed high school (6), an undergraduate degree (15), a postgraduate degree (10), or did not report their education
level (9). Participants were recruited as in Study 1.
2.1.2. Materials
The objects differed depending on the condition. In the literal (positive and neutral) trials, the objects matched the
words (e.g., toy horse for horse). In the Pretend trials, the objects were non-descript items such as blocks and sponges
(e.g., round block for horse). In the joke trials, the objects were mismatched items (e.g., coat for horse). See Appendix C
for the object and label pairings by condition. Nouns for the 16 Target Sentences were high frequency nouns in English
child directed speech, as verified by the Child Language Data Exchange System (CHILDES) database (MacWhinney,
2000). Thirty-eight parents filled out the Oxford-Communicative Development Inventory (Hamilton et al., 2000). Children
understood M = 94% (SD = 13%) of the target words. Objects for the distractor tasks, and video and audio equipment and
software were the same as in Study 1.
2.1.3. Design
The design was within-subjects. The independent variable was the Trial Type: Joke, Pretend, Positive Literal, or
Neutral Literal. The dependent variables were the same as Study 1. For the LSA, the variables were the same as Study 1.
2.1.4. Procedure and counterbalancing
Before the study, parents were only told that we were interested in discovering how parents and toddlers interact when
playing, including when they joke and pretend. Therefore the hypotheses were not disclosed. Each parent and toddler sat
at a table, with the parent in a chair, and the toddler in a high chair. Parents acted out four blocks of four 30-s trials: Neutral
Literal, Positive Literal, Pretending, and Joking. Before each block of trials parents were told, ‘‘I’m going to give you four
toys, one at a time.’’ Each object (e.g., shoe, block, chicken for Literal (Neutral and Positive), Pretend, and Joking
conditions respectively) was given with an accompanying Target Sentence (e.g., ‘‘This is a shoe.’’) Parents were then told:
Neutral Literal: ‘‘Could you show your child the toy and you can be quite serious with this one.’’; Positive Literal: ‘‘Feel free
just to play with the toy with your child.’’; Pretend: ‘‘This time it’s pretending. So if you could pretend that this [point to
object, e.g., block] is this [point to Target Sentence; e.g., shoe] then that would be great.’’; Joking: ‘‘This one’s joking so it’s
about using the objects in the wrong way, so if you could joke around that this [point to object, e.g., chicken] is this [point to
Target Sentence, e.g., shoe] then that would be great.’’ Children could have heard these general instructions, however it
seems unlikely that they would show a greater effect than parents’ interactions themselves. We chose to instruct parents
to show their excitement and happiness in the Positive Literal condition, and to be serious in the Neutral Literal condition to
control for emotion.
Joke, Pretend, Positive Literal, and Neutral Literal trial types were crossed with each of four sets of object labels, each
set containing the word for an animal, vehicle, clothing item, and eating item. Parents acted out a subset of all the
condition-label set pairings. For example, one parent would joke with Set 1 (Coat = ‘‘Horse’’, Chicken = ‘‘Hat’’,
Plate = ‘‘Train’’, Airplane = ‘‘Spoon’’), then interact literally (Neutral Literal) with Set 2 (Cow, Shoe, Boat, Fork), play
literally (Positive Literal) with Set 3 (Dog, Bib, Bus, Cup), then pretend with Set 4 (Round Block = ‘‘Pig’’, Bath
Scrub = ‘‘Sock’’, Scrunchy Hairband = ‘‘Car’’, Square Block = ‘‘Bowl’’). However, another parent would play literally
(Positive Literal) with Set 4 (Pig, Sock, Car, Bowl), then joke with Set 3 (Coat = ‘‘Dog’’, Chicken = ‘‘Bib’’, Plate = ‘‘Bus’’,
Airplane = ‘‘Cup’’), then pretend with Set 2 (Round Block = ‘‘Cow’’, Bath Scrub = ‘‘Shoe’’, Scrunchy Hairband = ‘‘Boat’’,
Square Block = ‘‘Fork’’), then interact literally (Neutral Literal) with Set 1 (Horse, Hat, Train, Spoon; see Appendix D for
counterbalancing). Across all parents, all combinations of condition, set, and order were acted out. Parents and children
played with distractor objects for one minute between blocks (same as Study 1).
Target Sentences were the same across trials to allow experimental control -- any differences in responses by parents
and children would be attributed to how the Objects related to the Target Sentences, and could not be attributed to the
Target Sentences alone. Additionally, it was necessary to use different objects across conditions. For instance, if we had
used a toy train for the trial where parents say, ‘‘This is a train.’’ in all four conditions, it would be difficult for a parent to
pretend or joke it was a train because it literally was a train. Thus we chose, in this instance, a scrunchy hairband in the
pretend condition, and a plate in the joke condition, so that utterances would be non-literal. Additionally, objects differed in
the pretend and joke conditions because, as stated in the introduction for Study 2, 2-year-olds pretend with objects with no
obvious functions, therefore a plate would not be suitable for pretending. Similarly, we discussed that 2-year-olds joke with
objects that are quite distinct, e.g., joking a car is a hat. Therefore using an ambiguous object might not have good
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comedic effect. It was thus necessary to use different types of objects so that parents could express pretending and joking
in age-appropriate ways.
Children played with the objects with their parents throughout the trials. The experimenter sat behind an occluder
during the trials, and switched the objects between trials. Study 2 was filmed as in Study 1.
2.1.5. Coding
Same as Study 1. Five (11%) of the videos were coded for agreement. Agreement was good for gaze, k = 0.70,
pointing, k = 0.74, and smiling, k = 0.61.
2.2. Results and discussion
2.2.1. Data analysis
The same statistical software and set of hypotheses were used as in Study 1. Nineteen parents were not included in the
IDS GORIC MANOVA analyses because they had at least one block where they either said none of the Target Sentences
correctly, and/or the Target Sentences were masked with noise. This left 24 parents for the IDS analyses.
Outliers were removed for IDS and communicative-referential combinations to normalize data. A cubic root
transformation normalized children’s looks to parents. A natural log transformation normalized parents’ and children’s
smiles. None of the transformations normalized the pointing data, so LMEM were used.
Initial analyses revealed no effects of parent gender on any variable, nor age on any variable except pointing. This
suggests mothers and fathers cue their toddlers in the same ways, and toddlers respond to mothers and fathers in the
same ways, converging with evidence that mothers and fathers express explicit cues in similar way with their toddlers,
such as belief and disbelief language (Hoicka and Butcher, in press). Parents were more likely to point with younger
children than older children (under, over 21 months, 4 days, based on median split), x2(1) = 10.36, p = 0.013, Odds-
Ratio = 9.53, p < .001.
2.2.2. Parents’ cues and children’s responses
Fig. 1 gives the means and standard errors for parents’ IDS. Fig. 2 gives the means and standard errors for parents’
and children’s smiles. Fig. 3 gives the means and standard errors for parents’ and children’s gaze to objects and each
other. Fig. 4 gives the means and standard errors for parents’ communicative-referential combinations.
Table 3 shows which model best explains the data for each dependent variable. Out of 43 trials, parents pointed on 18
of the Joke trials, 17 of the Pretend trials, 16 of the Positive Literal trials, and 23 of the Neutral Literal trials. None of the
hypotheses improved the LMEM for pointing, nor were there any significant interactions with age, all p > .05.
Table 3 shows parents increased their use of communicative cues (smiling, exaggerated IDS) to express positive
emotion (H1). In contrast, parents did not use any other cues or cue combinations to signal positive emotion, attention
grabbing, or pedagogy. These results thus partially replicate the findings of the Action Study at a later stage of
development, albeit, less strongly.
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Table 3
GORIC values of each model for all parental cues, parents’ communicative-referential combinations, and children’s engagement in Study 2.
Numbers in bold indicate best models. IDS = Infant-Directed Speech.
N Unrestricted Emotion Attention Pedagogy
Pretend Pretend
=Joke =Literal =Joke =Literal
H0 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5
Parents
Gaze to child 43 1190.42 1198.42 1190.68 1201.19 1201.42 1201.42
Smiles 43 408.68 408.45 411.25 420.28 423.23 423.24
IDS 23 266.33 263.12 265.44 263.42 267.78 267.78
Gaze to objects 43 915.92 931.03 931.04 931.03 919.27 930.98
Communicative 42
-> Referential 1117.79 1119.78 1120.04 1123.78 1128.96 1128.96
Children
Gaze to parent 43 145.96 157.54 157.38 157.54 157.54 148.03
Smile 43 378.51 377.35 406.28 408.39 408.70 408.70
Gaze to objects 43 1158.99 1197.91 1197.23 1167.32 1197.99 1197.99
Table 3 shows children also increased smiling during emotionally positive contexts (H1). No other results were
explained by the main theories.
This study suggests parents and children used some communicative cues (smiling, IDS) to express positive emotion, but
otherwise, they did not use any cues to grab attention or for pedagogical purposes. This suggests that at this slightly later
stage of development, parents no longer rely on subtle cues to distinguish literal from non-literal, or joking from pretending.
2.2.3. Parent--child interactions
In order to more closely examine how parents’ cues predicted children’s behaviors, an LSA was run, as in Study 1.
However, we only included parents’ smiling and IDS, and children’s smiling, as parents and children only used these
behaviors to distinguish contexts. Table 4 shows all frequencies of each Behavior Type (e.g., Child Smile) following each
Behavior Type (e.g., Parent Smile) within 3 s, across all participants and conditions. The distribution of behaviors in Table 4
was not significantly different than expected by chance, x2(8) = 11.14, p > .05. Therefore we did not follow up to determine
transitional probabilities or ARs. Table 4 suggests children’s smiling was not influenced by parents’ smiling or IDS.
3. General discussion
3.1. Parents’ cues: positive emotion, attention grabbing, or pedagogy
Parents acted out Joke, Pretend, Positive Literal, and Neutral Literal scenarios, which were action based (Study 1, 16-
to 20-month-old toddlers), or verbally based (Study 2, 20- to 24-month-olds). Our first goal was to determine (1) whether
parents distinguish joke, pretend, and literal contexts using communicative and referential cues, as well as
communicative-referential combinations, and (2) whether this was because they were expressing increased positive
emotion, bidding for attention (perhaps to scaffold a difficult concept), or to discourage children from generalizing false
information. We found that parents differentiated cues for all three reasons.
The best models to explain our data suggested parents (both mothers and fathers) exaggerated IDS across both
studies to express increased positive emotion. That is, parents exaggerated IDS more in joke, pretend, and play contexts
than in neutral contexts. Parents (both mothers and fathers) also increased smiling in the Verbal Study to express
increased positive emotion. Finally, parents increased their use of communicative-referential combinations in the Action
Study for the same purpose. This suggests past research finding increases in IDS or smiling when parents joked or
pretended with their toddlers may have been due to non-literal situations which were more emotionally positive than the
controls (Hoicka and Gattis, 2012; Lillard et al., 2007; Mireault et al., 2012; Reissland and Snow, 1996). This converges
with several other studies interpreting IDS and smiling as emotionally positive in nature (Darwin, 1955; Ekman and
Rosenberg, 2005; Singh et al., 2002; Werker and Mcleod, 1989). It is interesting that increased positive emotion also
explained communicative-referential combinations in the Action Study. This goes against what pedagogy theory might
predict, as pedagogy theory suggests these cues are about expressing that information should be learnt and generalized
(Csibra and Gergely, 2006), not that people are happy. However, perhaps, as we shall see later, referential cues are more
central to pedagogy and learning itself, and any additional communicative cues might be related to emotion.
However, emotion did not explain all parental cues. In the Action Study, parents increased their gaze to children and
smiling in joke contexts versus all other contexts. This suggests parents bidded for attention to scaffold children’s
understanding of intentions to joke. Smiling could help signal to toddlers that the anomalous information contained within
the jokes was meant to be enjoyable. An alternative reason that parents may have increased smiling in past research
could therefore be to scaffold infants’ understanding of jokes (Mireault et al., 2012). Gazing to the child could grab toddlers’
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Table 4
Observed frequencies and expected frequencies (brackets) of toddlers’ behavior
types following parents’ behavior types within 3 s, across all participants and
conditions in Study 2.




Smile 162 (138) 246 (270)
Cease smiling 180 (195) 398 (383)
Exaggerated IDS 19 (24) 51 (46)
Understated IDS 16 (21) 45 (40)
attention to ensure that they then learned other information about jokes. For instance, when parents joke with their 16- to
20-month-olds, parents also increase their use of disbelief language compared to when they pretend or play literally
(Hoicka and Butcher, in press). For example, after ‘‘drinking’’ with their elbow, they may say, ‘‘That’s not how you’re
supposed to drink.’’ By gazing more often to the child, this might grab children’s attention to allow them to attend to any
other information which may help toddlers understand the joke.
Interestingly, in the Action Study, parents decreased their gaze to objects, a referential cue, when joking, compared to
all other conditions. This converges with pedagogy theory, as referential cues are meant to express that information
should be learnt and generalized (Csibra and Gergely, 2006). Parents may be keen for their toddlers to avoid learning and
generalizing information contained in jokes, so reducing this cue makes sense. In particular, if parents avoid looking at
objects, children might also avoid looking at them, and hence avoid learning the jokes as true. This converges with
research finding parents repeat joke actions less often than pretend or literal actions when playing with their toddlers
(Hoicka and Butcher, in press). By drawing less attention to objects, children may be less likely to believe that the
information contained within a joke is true and generalizable.
Not all cues were explained by the above hypotheses. Neither study found parents used pointing to distinguish
contexts. This was likely due to the very low numbers of points that parents used. Perhaps when objects are close to hand,
pointing is unnecessary. Additionally, in the Verbal Study, parents showed no differences across conditions for gaze to
children or objects, or communicative-referential combinations. Altogether, the results show an interesting developmental
pattern across the two studies when it comes to parental cues. In the Action Study, parents gave ample support to
distinguish joke contexts from all others, through gaze to children and objects, as well as smiling. However, in Study 2,
parents never distinguished intentional contexts. This could be for two reasons. First, children in Study 2 were older, and
so parents may not have thought that children needed additional support to understand joking or pretending. Therefore
cues may only be used for younger children. However, parents of 20- to 24-month-olds do express more disbelief than
belief through their language and actions when joking versus pretending, and when pretending versus playing literally
(Hoicka and Butcher, in press), suggesting support is given. A second possibility is that parents feel older toddlers
understand explicit cues, such as disbelief language, better. Therefore they may no longer feel the need to use low-level
cues to help their toddlers understand jokes. Indeed, while 20- to 24-month-olds respond appropriately to parents’
disbelief language, 16- to 20-month-olds do not (Hoicka and Butcher, in press). Therefore younger toddlers may need
lower-level cues to support their understanding of jokes more than older toddlers.
3.2. Parents’ cues: joking versus pretending
The Action Study found parents increased their communicative cues and decreased their referential cues, when
joking compared to all other contexts, including pretending. This suggests pretending was viewed more as literal than
joking. In particular, during joke versus pretend and literal contexts, parents gazed to children and smiled more, but
gazed to objects less. This converges with evidence that pretending is seen as normative, and is a useful context for
children to learn generalizable information (Hoicka and Martin, in press; Hopkins et al., 2015; Rakoczy, 2008; Sutherland
and Friedman, 2012, 2013; Weisberg and Gopnik, 2013; Wyman et al., 2009). Therefore parents may not view
pretending and literal acts as different. Indeed, while pretend acts technically violate norms (e.g., we do not normally
drink nothing), within our imaginations, the acts follow norms (Nichols and Stich, 2003). In contrast, joking is seen as
violating norms (Hoicka and Gattis, 2008; Hoicka et al., 2008), and both parents and children reject information
contained in jokes (Hoicka and Butcher, in press; Hoicka et al., 2015; Hoicka and Martin, in press). For instance, 3- and 4-
year-olds will learn new words from a sincere speaker over someone who gives cues they are joking, even if they have
never encountered either person before, and have no other information about the speakers’ knowledge or competence
(Hoicka et al., 2015). Furthermore, although humor enhances learning in 18-month-olds, toddlers in this study learned
the literal action, not the joke (Esseily et al., in press). The current study shows parents support this distinction with 16- to
20-month-olds through communicative and referential cues.
In contrast, the Verbal Study found no distinctions across intentional contexts. As discussed previously, parents may
not feel they need to support older toddlers in distinguishing these contexts. However, previous research finds that
parents do distinguish these contexts with explicit language and action based cues, to which older toddlers respond
(Hoicka and Butcher, in press). Therefore it is more likely that because older toddlers are more responsive to verbal
feedback (Hoicka and Butcher, in press), parents may no longer feel the need to guide their toddlers’ attention with lower-
level cues when teaching them about abstract concepts.
3.3. Children’s responses
Our third goal was to determine whether children distinguish contexts, and whether parents’ communicative and
referential cues guide toddlers to do so. Both studies found children smile more during emotionally positive contexts. That
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is, they smiled more in all contexts except the neutral ones, whether they were with their mother or father. This converges
with research that smiling expresses positive emotion (Darwin, 1955; Ekman and Rosenberg, 2005). Additionally, the
Action Study suggests children, like parents, are more likely to gaze to parents, and less likely to gaze to objects,
during joke contexts versus all other contexts. Therefore parents successfully bid for social attention when joking,
suggesting children may have an opportunity to, for instance, pay attention to disbelief language (Hoicka and Butcher,
in press). Children may also be less likely to learn and generalize jokes as they attend less to objects, supporting the
pedagogical view that parents decrease referential cues so that children are less likely to learn the misinformation
inherent to jokes.
These findings also suggest children saw joking and pretending as different, with pretending being more akin to
literal interactions. This extends research that children distinguish intentions to joke from sincere intentions, and
intentions to pretend from sincere intentions. For instance, experimental evidence suggests toddlers distinguish jokes
and mistakes from 25 months (Hoicka and Gattis, 2008; Hoicka and Akhtar, 2011), and distinguish pretending from
trying from 3 years (Rakoczy et al., 2004). Furthermore, 18- to 24-month-olds are more likely to laugh when being read
a humorous versus literal book (Hoicka et al., 2008). This also converges with research showing 16- to 24-month-olds
distinguish joking and pretending through explicit cues, including actions and language (Hoicka and Butcher, in
press), and experimental research showing 2-year-olds are more likely to object to joking than pretending (Hoicka and
Martin, in press).
Parental support helped children distinguish emotional and intentional contexts in the Action Study. Parents’ gaze to
children increased children’s gaze to parents. Similarly, parents’ gaze to objects increased children’s gaze to objects.
Additionally, parents’ smiling decreased children’s gaze to objects, while when parents ceased to smile, this decreased
children’s gaze to parents. Furthermore, children smiled more after parents smiled, and less when parents ceased to
smile. Given that parental cues predicted children’s communicative and referential responses, the ability to distinguish
these contexts appears to be directly related to parental cues. This converges with research that parents’ explicit cues,
such as belief and disbelief language and actions, help toddlers distinguish joke, pretend, and literal contexts (Hoicka
and Butcher, in press). This research also converges with evidence that parents’ cues help children learn in other
contexts. Toddlers whose parents provide more pretense cues at 18 months better understand adults’ pretend actions at
24 months (Nakamichi, 2015). Toddlers speak more when parents produce more disbelief language during book reading
(Hoicka et al., 2008). Finally, infants are more likely to laugh or re-produce strange actions when parents laugh (Mireault
et al., 2012; Reddy, 2001), and are more likely to continue smiling at a joke when parents smile (Mireault et al., 2014,
2015).
However, in the Verbal Study, children, like parents, did not distinguish intentional contexts. Additionally, parental cues
did not guide toddlers’ responses. One possibility is that children in the Verbal Study were incapable of distinguishing
contexts. However, the Action Study, where toddlers were even younger, suggests otherwise. A second possibility is that
this demonstrates a developmental shift from the middle to the end of the second year. While older 1-year-olds in the
Verbal Study did not distinguish intentional contexts or respond to parental cues, Hoicka and Butcher (in press) found
older toddlers distinguished joke, pretend, and literal contexts through explicit parental cues, such as belief and disbelief
language and actions. Therefore low-level cues, such as gaze and smiling, may only work for younger toddlers, who have
more limited action and language understanding than older toddlers (Fenson et al., 1994; Hamilton et al., 2000). Toddlers
may transition to focussing on more content-related cues as they get older, for which they may not need their parents’
more subtle guidance to help them attend.
3.4. Pedagogy theory
According to pedagogy theory, parents use communicative cues to express that information should be learnt and
generalized, and young children interpret these cues appropriately (Csibra and Gergely, 2006). However, the present
studies found parents exaggerated communicative cues to express positive emotion, or to grab attention during joke
intentional contexts, which contain information that should not be generalized. This creates a conundrum. If parents
use these cues to signal both generalizable and non-generalizable contexts, how can toddlers make sense of them?
And why would parents exaggerate these cues in non-literal contexts if it meant young children would generalize non-
literal information, in particular jokes? The results of these studies suggest an alternative interpretation for the use of
communicative cues. Instead, parents may use these cues when information is difficult, rather than when it is novel and
generalizable per se, in order to give more social support to help their child through the situation. This interpretation
makes sense for both non-literal information and novel generalizable information. Joking could be difficult for
children to understand, requiring parents to gain their attention to scaffold supporting information (e.g., disbelief
statements). Similarly, novel generalizable information could also be difficult for children to understand, requiring
parents to gain children’s attention to scaffold a different type of supporting information. The supporting information
could be, for instance, the use of generic language, such as, ‘‘Dogs bark’’ (versus ‘‘This dog barks.’’) (Cimpian and
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Markman, 2008; Gelman and Bloom, 2007). This interpretation is leant further support from research finding intentional
cues helped 3-year-olds learn where an object was located, while communicative cues did not (Moore et al., 2013),
suggesting communicative cues may not be the key to learning and generalizing information as much as content-rich
cues are.
Perhaps the main focus of pedagogy theory should be referential cues. According to pedagogy theory, parents also
use these cues when they want their children to learn and generalize information (Csibra and Gergely, 2006). In the
current studies, parents were less likely to use referential cues to express non-literal versus literal information, in
particular, joking versus all other contexts. One reason for this could be that parents did not want children to attend too
much to the objects when joking because they did not want them to learn and generalize the information.
Finally, the individual communicative and referential cues may not be as important as the cue combinations. However,
in the Action Study, parents increased the use of communicative-referential combinations to express positive emotion,
rather than decreasing these combinations during joke contexts. Therefore it seems more likely that the referential cues
alone are important to pedagogy, not the combination of cues.
4. Conclusion
The currents studies found parents express communicative and referential cues for a variety of reasons. Parents
consistently exaggerated IDS to express positive emotion, and increased smiling for the same reason in the Verbal Study.
Therefore past research which found that parents increase these cues when joking or pretending may be explained by the
joke and pretend situations being more emotionally positive than their controls. In the Action study, parents also increased
their gaze to children and smiling, but decreased their gaze to objects, during the joke contexts. This suggests parents
used communicative cues to grab toddlers’ attention, perhaps to explain the jokes, but decreased referential cues so that
children would avoid generalizing the misinformation inherent to jokes. Toddlers in the Action Study responded to parental
cues, allowing them to distinguish emotional and intentional contexts in the same way as parents. This supports the idea
that communicative and referential cues provide a low-level mechanism to guide toddlers’ attention in order to learn about
jokes, while also avoiding generalizing information from jokes. However these findings were not replicated in the Verbal
Study, suggesting perhaps low-level cues were no longer appropriate for older toddlers who can better understand
language and action based cues.
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Appendix A
Counterbalancing of Study 1 -- the Action Study.
Trial
1 2 3 4
Order
1 Joke Neutral Positive Pretend
Washing Eating Dressing Coloring
2 Neutral Pretend Joke Positive
Washing Eating Dressing Coloring
3 Positive Joke Pretend Neutral
Washing Eating Dressing Coloring
4 Pretend Positive Neutral Joke
Washing Eating Dressing Coloring
5 Joke Neutral Positive Pretend
Eating Coloring Washing Dressing
6 Neutral Pretend Joke Positive
Eating Coloring Washing Dressing
7 Positive Joke Pretend Neutral
Eating Coloring Washing Dressing
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Appendix A (Continued )
Trial
1 2 3 4
8 Pretend Positive Neutral Joke
Eating Coloring Washing Dressing
9 Joke Neutral Positive Pretend
Dressing Washing Coloring Eating
10 Neutral Pretend Joke Positive
Dressing Washing Coloring Eating
11 Positive Joke Pretend Neutral
Dressing Washing Coloring Eating
12 Pretend Positive Neutral Joke
Dressing Washing Coloring Eating
13 Joke Neutral Positive Pretend
Coloring Dressing Eating Washing
14 Neutral Pretend Joke Positive
Coloring Dressing Eating Washing
15 Positive Joke Pretend Neutral
Coloring Dressing Eating Washing
16 Pretend Positive Neutral Joke
Coloring Dressing Eating Washing
Neutral = Neutral Literal; Positive = Positive Literal.
Appendix B
Target sentences and actions across conditions.
Set Target Sentence Target Action & Objects
Neutral Literal Positive Literal Pretend Joke
Washing I’m squeezing out the
soap






Squeeze plain bottle of
liquid soap with elbows
I’m washing my hands Wash hands in bucket of
water
Wash hands in bucket of
foamy water
Pretend to wash hands
in empty bucket
Put foam on own nose
from bucket of soapy
water
I’m drying my hands Dry hands with plain
towel
Dry hands with colorful
towel
Pretend to dry hands
with plain towel
Rub plain towel on own
head
Eating I’m going to eat this Eat some rice cake
pieces from plate
Eat some cookies from
plate
Pretend to eat from plate Put rice cake pieces on
plate on own forehead
I’m pouring myself a
drink
Pour water from bottle
into cup
Pour orange drink from
bottle into cup
Pretend to pour a drink
from empty bottle to
empty cup
Hold bottle of water over
own head
I’m going to have a
drink
Take a sip from cup of
water
Take a sip from cup of
orange drink
Pretend to have a sip
from empty cup
Put cup of water to
elbow
Dressing I’m putting the hat on
my head
Put plain hat on own
head
Put colorful fun hat on
own head
Put sponge on own head Put plain hat under own
arm
I’m putting the scarf
around my neck
Put plain scarf around
own neck
Put boa scarf around
own neck
Put rubber tube around
own neck
Put plain scarf on top of
own head
I’m putting the gloves
on my hands
Put plain glove on own
hand
Put colorful fun glove on
own hand
Put plastic wallet on own
hand
Put plain glove on own
elbow
Coloring Here are some
crayons
Pick up black crayons
from table
Pick up colorful crayons
from table
Pick stick up from table Hold black crayon with
elbow
This is how you color Coloring with black
crayons on white paper
with one big shape
Coloring with colorful
crayons on colored
paper with lots of shapes
Pretend to color with
stick on white paper with
one big shape
Put white paper with one
big shape on own head
and color with black
crayons
I’m coloring in the
shape
Coloring in one big
shape with black
crayons
Coloring in shapes with
colorful crayons
Pretend to color in one
big shape with stick on
white paper
Put crayon on own nose
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Appendix C
Counterbalancing of Study 2 -- the Verbal Study.
Block
1 2 3 4
Order
1 Joke Neutral Positive Pretend
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4
2 Neutral Pretend Joke Positive
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4
3 Positive Joke Pretend Neutral
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4
4 Pretend Positive Neutral Joke
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4
5 Joke Neutral Positive Pretend
Set 4 Set 3 Set 2 Set 1
6 Neutral Pretend Joke Positive
Set 4 Set 3 Set 2 Set 1
7 Positive Joke Pretend Neutral
Set 4 Set 3 Set 2 Set 1
8 Pretend Positive Neutral Joke
Set 4 Set 3 Set 2 Set 1
Neutral = Neutral Literal; Positive = Positive Literal.
Appendix D
Target sentences and objects across conditions.
Set Target Sentence Literal object (positive/neutral) Pretend object Joke object
1 This is a horse Horse Round block Coat
This is a hat Hat Bath scrub Chicken
This is a train Train Scrunchy hairband Plate
This is a spoon Spoon Square block Airplane
2 This is a cow Cow Round block Coat
This is a shoe Shoe Bath scrub Chicken
This is a boat Boat Scrunchy hairband Plate
This is a fork Fork Square block Airplane
3 This is a dog Dog Round block Coat
This is a bib Bib Bath scrub Chicken
This is a bus Bus Scrunchy hairband Plate
This is a cup Cup Square block Airplane
4 This is a pig Pig Round block Coat
This is a sock Sock Bath scrub Chicken
This is a car Car Scrunchy hairband Plate
This is a bowl Bowl Square block Airplane
Appendix E. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2015.10.010.
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